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Course Objectives

Philosophy in science

 

Lecturer: Majid D. Beni

Email: mbeni@metu.edu.tr

 

Course Description:

The course explores the bearing of cultural and historical situations on scientific knowledge. More precisely, it focuses on different versions of perspectivism in the philosophy of science.

 

Sources:

Woodward, J. (2021). Causation with a human face: Normative theory and descriptive psychology. Oxford University Press.
Massimi, M. (2022). Perspectival realism. Oxford University Press.

Cartwright, N. 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Coursework and distribution of grades:

Participation and attendance: Participations, which are supposed to be well-informed and thoughtful, are highly valued in this course. They include 15% of the grade, group presentations included. Midterm: a short essay demonstrating the student's ability to introduce and develop their ideas into the final paper. It constitutes 35% of the student’s grade. Final exam: an essay, around 4000 words in length. 50% of the grade.

 

When using material that is not their own, Students must make sure that they cite the author or refer to them in the appropriate manner. Cases of plagiarism will be punished relentlessly. The students are free to choose any of the standard citation styles when needed, but they need to remain consistent with their chosen style.

 

Civility: The course values a brave critical approach. At the same time, students are expected to treat the instructors and each other as well as the authors and opinions that will be discussed in the course cordially.

 

Changes to the program: The syllabus is provisional and it may be revised at any point during the semester. It is the students’ responsibility to keep updated about the syllabus.

 

PART I:

Laws and Modalities 

Week one: general introduction

Week two:

Reading from Massimi's book (details will be announced)

Week three:

Goodman, N. (1947). The problem of counterfactual conditionals. The Journal of Philosophy, 44(5), 113–128.

Week four:

Chisholm, R. M. (1946). The contrary-to-fact conditional. Mind, 55(220), 289–307.

Week four: 

Lange, M. (1999). Laws, counterfactuals, stability, and degrees of lawhood. Philosophy of Science, 66(2), 243–267.

Week five:

Dicken, P. (2007). Constructive empiricism and the metaphysics of modality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, 605–612.

Week six: 

TBA

Week seven: mid-term

 

PART II:

Data and Phenomena

Week eight: 

Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the Phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97(3), 303. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185445

Week nine:

McAllister, J. W. (1997). Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets. Erkenntnis, 47(2), 217–228. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005387021520

McAllister, J. W. (2010). The Ontology of Patterns in Empirical Data. Philosophy of Science, 77(5), 804–814. https://doi.org/10.1086/656555

 Week ten:

Schindler, S. (2007). Rehabilitating theory: refusal of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of scientific phenomena. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 38(1), 160–184. 

 Week eleven:       

Massimi, M. (2007). Saving Unobservable Phenomena. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,                                                                                                 

Week twelve: 

TBA

Week thirteen

TBA

Week fourteen:

TBA